Appendix B

From "China Presents Her Case to the United Nations," Item 68 of the Agenda of the General Assembly, Fourth Session, of the United Nations, pp. 17-18.

    "In addition to Japanese arms and ammunition captured by or surrendered to the Soviet Army, which were transferred in large quantities to the Chinese Communist forces in Manchuria to assist them in their armed rebellion against the Chinese National Government, the Soviet Union supplied the Chinese Communist forces with arms and ammunition manufactured in the Soviet Union itself. Some samples of these captured equipment are listed as follows:

(a) Thirteen cases of explosives manufactured in the Soviet Union captured on October 4, 1946, when the Chinese Communists were dynamiting the railway near Kungchiachiao between Hailung and Meihoko.
(b) Soviet-manufactured rifles captured during the campaigns north of Changchun between November, 1946, and March, 1947.
(c) Soviet-manufactured rifles captured during the fifth Szepingkai campaign, June 10-30, 1947.
(d) German-type Soviet-manufactured rifles captured during the Szepingkai campaign.
(e) Soviet-manufactured air-cooled type heavy machine-guns captured during the Szepingkai campaign.
(f) Soviet-manufactured light machine-guns captured during the Szepingkai campaign.
(g) Soviet-manufactured artillery shells captured July 1949 in North Hunan and the Northwest theater.
(h) Soviet-manufactured Sikcarlof machine-guns captured during battle of Hsinhsien, Shinsi Province, August 1946.
(i) 27 machine-guns of the same type as (h), captured at the battle along the Chengting-Taiyuan Railway, April 28, 1947. (Photographs of the above items are available for inspection.)

. . . Soviet military aid to the Chinese Communists also included military training which was openly done by Soviet authorities. Soviet instructors were on the staff of Chinese Communist military schools, especially in artillery and mechanized warfare training, at various points in Manchuria. The main school was located at Kiamutse, where a large number of Soviet instructors were concentrated. Soviet instructors also helped in the training of the Chinese Communist air force, with one center at Tsitsihar, in north Manchuria, and another center at Khabarovsk, in the Soviet Union itself. The Chinese Consulate General in Khabarovsk reported that, on June 23, 1948, a group of some 50 Chinese wearing Communist air force uniforms were sighted on Marx Street in Khabarovsk.
    In addition, large groups of Chinese youths were sent to the Soviet Union for military training. For instance, the Chinese Ministry of National Defense reported that a group of some 300 graduates of secondary schools, all natives of Manchuria, passed through Suifenho in Manchuria on April 27, 1948, on their way to Spask in the Soviet Union, to revive Soviet training in navigation and in amphibious warfare. Another group of 350, composed of students from the North China provinces of Shansi, Chahar and Hopei, passed through Ulam Bator, capital of Outer Mongolia, on July 4, 1948, for advanced training in the Soviet Union. Still another group of 300, from Inner Mongolia, Suiyuan and Chahar, was reported to have gone to the Soviet Union for training in motorized warfare."

Appendix C

Extracts from General Wedemeyer's report of 1947 as given in Annex 135 of White Paper on China.

"I was assured by the Generalissimo that China would support to the limit of her ability an American program for the stabilization of the Far East. He stated categorically that, regardless of normal encouragement or material aid received from the United States, he is determined to oppose Communism and to create a democratic form of government in consonance with Doctor Sun Yat-sen's principles. He stated further that he plans to make sweeping reforms in the government including the removal of incompetent and corrupt officials. He stated that some progress has been made along these lines but, with spiraling inflation, economic distress and civil war, it has been difficult to accomplish fully these objectives. He emphasized that, when the Communist problem is solved, he could drastically reduce the army and concentrate upon political and economic reforms. I retain the conviction that the Generalissimo is sincere in his desire to attain these objectives . . ." (italics added)

"Soviet actions, contrary to the letter and spirit of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of 1945 and its related documents, have strengthened the Chinese Communist position in Manchuria, with political, economic and military repercussions on the National Government's position both in Manchuria and in China proper, and have made more difficult peace and stability in China. The present trend points toward a gradual disintegration of the National Government's control, with the ultimate possibility of a Communist-dominated China . . ."

"The present industrial potential of China is inadequate to support military forces effectively. Chinese forces under present conditions cannot cope successfully with internal strife or fulfill China's obligations as a member of the family of nations. Hence outside aid, in the form of munitions (most urgently ammunition) and technical assistance, is essential before any plan of operations can be undertaken with a reasonable prospect of success. Military advice is now available to the Nationalists on a General Staff level through American military advisory groups. The Generalissimo expressed to me repeatedly a strong desire to have this advice and supervision extended in scope to include field forces, training centers and particularly logistical agencies." (italics added)

In his "Conclusions" General Wedemeyer said:

"The peaceful aims of freedom-loving peoples in the world are jeopardized today by developments as portentous as those leading to World War II.
    "The Soviet Union and her satellites give no evidence of a conciliatory or co-operative attitude in these developments. The United States is compelled, therefore to initiate realistic lines of action in order to create and maintain bulwarks of freedom, and to protect United States strategic interests.
    "The bulk of the Chinese are not disposed to Communism and they are not concerned with ideologies. They desire food, shelter and the opportunity to live in peace."

"China dominated by Chinese Communists would be inimical to the interests of the United States, in view of their openly expressed hostility and active opposition to those principles which the United States regards as vital to the peace of the world.
    "The Communists have the tactical initiative in the overall military situation. The Nationalist position in Manchuria is precarious, and in Shantung and Hopei Provinces strongly disputed. Continued deterioration of the situation may result in the early establishment of a Soviet satellite government in Manchuria and ultimately in the evolution of a Communist-dominated China."

"A program of aid, if effectively employed, would bolster opposition to Communist expansion, and would contribute to gradual development of stability in China."

"Due to excesses and oppressions by government police agencies basic freedoms of the people are being jeopardized. Maladministration and corruption cause a loss of confidence in the Government. Until drastic political and economic reforms are undertaken United States aid cannot accomplish its purpose.
    "Even so, criticism of results achieved by the National Government in efforts for improvement should be tempered by a recognition of the handicaps imposed on China by eight years of war, the burden of her opposition to Communism, and her sacrifices for the Allied cause. (italics added)
    "A United States program of assistance could best be implemented under the supervision of American advisors in specified economic and military fields. Such a program can be undertaken only if China requests advisory aid as well as material assistance."

In his "Recommendations" General Wedemeyer wrote:

"That the United States Government provide as early as practicable moral, advisory, and material support to China in order to contribute to the early establishment of peace in the world in consonance with the enunciated principles of the United Nations, and concomitantly to protect United States strategic interests against militant forces which now threaten them . . . "

In the "Political" appendix to his report he said:

"In view of the continued economic deterioration in National Government areas, it may be said that the American mediation effort has been to the advantage of the Chinese Communists and conversely to the disadvantage of the National Government . . ." (italics added)
    "The Chinese Communists are self-professed Communists bound ideologically to the Soviet Union. They proclaim as their eventual aim the establishment of a Communist state in China. The Chinese Communists constantly foster anti-American feeling in areas under their control, picturing the United States as an imperialistic power which has as its objective the enslavement of the world. Their ruthless tactics of land distribution and oppression of the Christian missionary movement have made for them bitter enemies among many Chinese in the rural areas. Some sources say that Communist land reforms have benefited the poor peasants who comprise the majority of the rural population and who, therefore, support the Communists, while other sources say that Communist terroristic tactics have alienated the vast majority of peasants. Where local government, regardless of ideology, is competent, honest and humane, there is no local revolt. Whether by suasion or by intimidation, the Communists have in many areas been successful in organizing the countryside against the National Government."

    "The Soviet Union has assisted the Chinese Communists in Manchuria by the timing of the withdrawal of Soviet troops and by making available, wither directly or indirectly, large quantities of surrendered Japanese military equipment. . . ."

General Wedemeyer in fact proposed a realistic and intelligent China policy for the United States. He admitted, indeed emphasized, all the weaknesses and shortcomings of the Chinese National Government, and his criticisms on this score are quoted with approval in the White Paper's text. But Wedemeyer was so well aware of the vital security needs of the United States that, instead of writing off China as the State Department had done, he proposed measures which could have led both to reform and Communist defeat. Specifically he recommended both arms aid to China and China's acceptance of American advisers "as responsible representatives of the United States Government in specified military and economic fields to assist China in utilizing U.S. aid in the manner for which it is intended."
    General Wedemeyer's repudiation of the State Department's policy was emphatically stated in the recommendations he made to President Truman. In the section of his suppressed report headed "Implications of 'No Assistance' to China or Continuation of 'Wait and See' Policy" he wrote:

"To advise at this time a policy of 'no assistance' to China would suggest the withdrawal of the United States Military and Naval Advisory Groups from China and it would be equivalent to cutting the ground from under the feet of the Chinese Government. Removal of American assistance, without removal of Soviet assistance, would certainly lay the country open to eventual Communist domination. It would have repercussions in other parts of Asia, would lower American prestige in the Far East and would make easier the spread of Soviet influence and Soviet political expansion not only in Asia but in other areas of the world. (italics added)
    "It is possible that the adoption of a 'wait and see' policy would lead to the Generalissimo's finally carrying out genuine reforms which in turn would enable the United States to extend effective aid and which themselves would furnish the best answer to the challenge of Comnmunism. Because of an inevitable time lag in its results, however, such a policy would permit for an appreciable time the continuation of the process of National Government disintegration. At some stage of the disintegration the authority and control of the National Government might become so weak and restricted that separatist movements would occur in various areas now under Government control. At this point, it is conceivable there might emerge a middle group which would be able to establish a modicum of stability in the areas under its control. It would then be possible for the United States to extend support, both moral and material, to any such group or combination of groups which gave indication of ability to consolidate control over sizable portions of the country and whose policies would be compatible with our own. This, however, represents conjecture regarding a possible future course of events in China. There is the further possibility that such a policy would result at some point in the Generalissimo's seeking a compromise with the Chinese Communists, although it is likely that he would not do so until his position became so weak that the Communists would accept a settlement only on terms assuring them a dominant position in the government. At worst, under a process of continued National Government disintegration it may be expected that there would be a long period of disturbance verging on chaos, at the end of which the Chinese Communists would emerge as the dominant group oriented toward the Soviet Union."

General Wedemeyer, who so exactly foretold the dire consequences to the United States of denying aid to the Chinese National Government, now commands the Sixth Army with h headquarters at San Francisco. The general opinion in Washington is that he was shelved on account of his opposition to the State Department's and General Marshall's China policy, instead of being made Chief of Staff.